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Abstract
In interactive theorem proving, tactics and tacticals have been introduced to au-
tomate proof search. In this scenario, user interaction traditionally is restricted to
the mode in which the user decides which tactic to apply on the top-level, without
being able to interact with the tactic once it has begun running.
We propose a technique to allow the implementation of derivational analogy in
tactical theorem proving. Instead of replaying tactics including backtracked dead
ends our framework makes choice points in tactics explicit and thus avoids dead ends
when reusing tactics. Additionally users can override choices a tactic has made or
add additional steps to a derivation without terminating the tactic. The technique
depends on an eÆcient replay of tactic executions without repeating search that the
original computation may have involved.
1 Introduction
In interactive theorem proving, tactics and tacticals have been introduced to
automate proof search. In its simplest case, a tactic is a sequence of rules
to be applied in order. Virtually all tactic languages provide additional con-
trol structures like iteration, conditional branching or indeterministic choice
over tactics. These control structures are called tacticals. Tacticals provide
c
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a means to write more powerful tactics. Invoking a tactic on a goal produ-
ces a representation of the (partial) proof that the tactic constructs while
simplifying the original goal.
Tactics decompose a goal into subgoals and call other tactics or themselves
recursively to solve these subgoals. In this sense tactics are a way to structure
strategic knowledge about proof search. This describes the static call graph of
a set of related tactics. E.g. an induction tactic sets up the induction, applies a
dierence reduction tactic to the induction conclusion and hypothesis, applies
the induction hypothesis, and nally simplies the result.
Executing such a tactic gives rise to another dynamic structure, namely
the tree of tactic calls that were actually carried out while solving a problem.
This structure is closely related to the call graph but depends on the goal the
tactic is run on. It is a summary of the call stack over the time of the tactic
execution and describes the computation that was carried out to apply the tac-
tic to a concrete goal. Because tactics involve search (usually implemented by
indeterministic choice and explicit failure with backtracking) whole subtrees
of this structure may correspond to branches of the search space that turned
out to be dead ends. I.e. they describe computations that do not manifest
themselves in the nal proof representation. As an example, depending on
the goal, the dierence reduction tactic might call itself twice on subproblems
and a simplication tactic inside one of the recursive calls. Also it might have
to undo the second call to itself because the call did not produce the desired
result and try again in a dierent way after some additional rewriting.
If we have a closer look at this structure we see two ways in which a user
can interact with a tactical theorem prover. First, the user can decide which
tactics to apply at the top-level and let the tactics ll in the details. I.e. the
user decides on the overall structure of the proof while the machine decides on
the details. This technique is applied in many theorem provers like Isabelle,
PVS, Coq, KIV, Inka.
Another way the user should be able to interact with the theorem prover
is to let a tactic decide on the overall proof. If the prover gets stuck the user
decides on the details by overriding decisions of the tactic, inserting inter-
mediate steps or suggesting a dierent way to solve a particular subproblem
without otherwise terminating the tactic. I.e. after the intervention by the
user the tactic carries on with what was left for it to do when the user in-
tervened. In current theorem provers this way of interaction is not possible
without changing the code of tactics and rerunning them. This has two severe
disadvantages: the code of the tactics needs to be changed by the user and
the tactics have to be rerun, repeating all the search that the tactic carried
out before the intervention. In current theorem provers, when a tactic gives
up the prover either does backtracking and leaves the user with the original
proof state the tactic started out with, or it leaves a proof state corresponding
to the partial success the tactic had. In any case the tactic call stack is gone
and the user is back at the top-level. There is no way to intervene and then
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resume the original tactic at the place it gave up. That is, once a tactic has
started it either produces a result fully automatically, or it does not produce
a result at all. An integration of automation and interaction is not possible
once a tactic has been started.
In this paper we describe a technique that enables the second mode of
interaction. The basic idea is the following: while executing a tactic on a goal
the prover collects a trace of the computation. Each element of this trace
corresponds to a point of time in the execution of the tactic. If the user wants
to suggest an intermediate step to the tactic, the prover can reexecute the
initial part of the computation along the trace that it had collected earlier.
When it reaches the point where the user wants to intervene it can execute
a tactic that was given by the user. We call such a tactic callback. Since the
prover has reexecuted the initial part of the computation, the callback can be
executed in exactly the same situation in which the theorem prover was when
the original, supposedly unsuccessful subtactic was executed. In particular
all information that was collected by the execution of the tactic up to this
point in time in the original execution is again present (including information
entered by the user in the original execution). Our technique takes care that
the reexecution of the trace is carried out in synchronization with the tactic
that generated the trace in the rst place. This means that not only can the
callback be executed in the situation in which the original tactic would have
been carried on, but also can the original tactic be resumed at exactly the
same place in its execution in which it was intercepted.
The user can also override a decision by the tactic. Assume that the tactic
has decided to apply a particular lemma at some point in the proof search,
but the user has decided that it would be better to use another lemma. This
is achieved by reexecuting the initial part of the computation up to the point
at which the wrong lemma was chosen by the tactic. This decision is overriden
by the lemma determined by the user and the tactic resumes with the new
lemma instead of the old one.
In order to allow this mode of interaction, we assume a standard tactic lan-
guage that oers facilities most tactic languages in use provide. In particular
the language supports explicit choice from a list of alternatives and explicit
failure to initiate backtracking. The language also supports calls to functi-
ons dened in the underlying programming language which does not support
the kind of backtracking needed for implementing choice and failure. These
operations interface the tactics to the proof representation and objects of the
logic, and they also serve to use the full power of an eÆcient programming
language to compute heuristic information.
Since the technique depends on the reexecution of tactics involving search it
is crucial that dead branches of the search space can be cut o when repeating
a computation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2 we give a mo-
tivating example of a situation in which we can use our technique. Sect. 3
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Fig. 1. Structure of example induction tactic
...
Step case
Ripple out Fertilize Simplify
Fig. 2. Proof representation for failed proof
informally describes the technique. Sect. 4 revisits the earlier example and
shows how the technique works in this case. Sect. 5 discusses how the techni-
que can be used to reuse proofs analogically. Finally, we describe related work
in Sect. 6 and conclude.
2 An Example
Suppose we want to prove the theorem 8x: 9y: half(y) = x by induction on x,
given natural numbers generated by 0 and s( ) and the rewrite rules half(0) = 0
and half(s(s(X))) = s(half(X)). We will use an induction strategy which is
implemented as a tactic with the structure given in Fig. 1.
The gure shows the call graph of the tactic: `step case', e.g., calls `ripple
out', `fertilize', and `simplify' in this order.
`Induction' sets up the base and step case. For brevity, we will ignore the
base case in the rest of the example. The formula to prove in the step case is
8x: [9y: half(y) = x] =) [9y: half(y) = s(x)]
from which the quantiers are removed by skolemization. `Ripple out' uses
rippling to make the induction hypothesis applicable to the induction conclu-
sion. Rippling [3,9] is a reasoning technique exploiting the semantic knowledge
that the induction hypothesis must be applied in the step case, and additio-
nally assumes that the induction conclusion contains syntactically the induc-
tion hypothesis. The dierences between induction conclusion and induction
hypothesis are called wave-fronts and are denoted by boxes, while the com-
mon parts compose the skeleton and are denoted by underlining them. E.g.,
in our example the dierences between induction conclusion and induction
hypothesis are represented by
half(y) = x =) half(Y ) = s(x)
The Rippling technique tries to apply so-called wave rules, like the denition
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of half
half( s(s(U)) ) = s(half(U)) ;
that preserve the skeleton while moving the dierences to the outside, in order
to eventually end up in a situation where the induction hypothesis is a proper
subterm of the induction conclusion. In the running example there is no wave
rule to move the only wave front occurring in
half(y) = x =) half(Y ) = s(x)
and the induction hypothesis is directly applicable anyway for Y  y. So
`ripple out' returns and `fertilize' applies the induction hypothesis:
half(y) = x =) x = s(x)
The subsequent simplication then fails because s is a free constructor. So,
the system comes back to the user saying that there is an open goal it could
not solve. The resulting proof state (proof representation) that has been built
and which is displayed to the user (cf. Fig. 2) includes the open goal, and links
{ representing reasoning steps { which are annotated by the part of the tactic
that has produced them. Browsing the sequence of reasoning steps that lead
to the open goal, the user will notice Y would have to be instantiated to a
term dierent from y. And indeed, we can repair the proof by introducing an
additional wave front by instantiating Y with s(s( )) before we ripple out (we
will come back to this example in Sect. 4).
In current systems, what we have to do in this case is either to change the
tactic code and try again from scratch, or to remove the parts of the proof
representation that was built after `normalize' and carry out the introduction
of wave rules and the rest of the induction tactic manually. Since our tactics
are procedural (rather than declarative), we cannot use the induction tactic
in the latter case because we would have to restart it right in the middle. In
Sect. 3 we describe a technique that enables us to interact with the theorem
prover in such a way that we can intercept the induction tactic before `ripple
out' is called, introduce the wave front manually, and then resume the tactic
as if the wave front had been introduced by the tactic itself.
3 Tactic Language
In this section we explain our technique in an informal way. We describe the
semantics of tactics in continuation passing style which is a standard techni-
que (cf. [1,8,17,15,6,5]). The idea is to describe the evaluation of an expression
e with respect to (wrt.) a continuation S which represents the future of the
computation after e has been evaluated. A continuation S is a function of
one argument. In order to evaluate e wrt. S, the continuation S is applied
to the value that e evaluates to. Evaluation of a literal l wrt. S is, therefore,
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described by S(l). Evaluation of complex expressions is decomposed in such a
way that a part of the expression is evaluated wrt. a new continuation which
combines the rest of the evaluation of the complex expression and also con-
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, its evaluation relative to S can be described by saying that e
1
should be evaluated (assume the result is h) wrt. the continuation that evalua-
tes e
2
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(assume the result is t) and then applies the original continuation
S to the list composed of the head h and the tail t. Evaluation of complex
expressions can be decomposed until the expression to evaluate is a literal or
variable and the rest of the evaluation is encoded in the success continuation.
This denes a non-standard interpreter for the tactic programming language
in continuation passing style. So we can also view the denition operationally
as the way in which a tactic expression is executed. The general idea is that
evaluation is attened (or sequentialised) into a sequence of basic evalutation
steps. This is in contrast to the standard evaluation strategy, which evaluates
an expression by evaluating its subexpressions along its syntactic structure,
its abstract syntax tree, and does not explicitly sequentialise the evaluation.
Tactics can be dened and named, e.g. as in \tactic f(x) = e", where the
formal parameter x of the named tactic f may be free in the body e. Tactics
may call other named tactics to solve subgoals of the current goal. Depending
on the proof representation this necessitates setting up the proof state to focus
on the subproblem before evaluating the body of the called tactic. It may also
necessitate cleaning up after evaluating the body. This is dependent on the
concrete proof representation, and the semantics has to take care that setting
and cleaning up are done appropriately, i.e. before and after a tactic is called.
Note that the interpreter knows which named tactic is being called and the
actual values it is called with when it sets up the proof state. So it is possible
to make the proof state dependent on the tactic that is called.
3.1 Backtracking
We assume the tactic language includes a special operator choose which imple-
ments search. It evaluates its argument, which should be a list of alternatives,
and then chooses the rst alternative for which the remaining part of the eva-
luation is successful, i.e. does not fail. If there is no such alternative, choose
fails itself. As usual this is realised by backtracking and can be done straight-
forwardly in the setting of continuations by using a second continuation F
that encodes the future of the evaluation if the evaluation of an expression
fails. Again this is a standard technique covered in the literature cf. [1]. Tac-
tics can explicitly call fail which is an abbreviation for choose([]) and fails
straightaway. In order for this to work properly, side eects of tactics need to
be restricted such that they can be backtracked over.
In particular, because there is an interaction between the evaluation of
tactic expressions and the proof representation, the semantics has to ensure
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that the proof representation is adjusted when backtracking occurs. This is
important in particular when updating the proof representation is done by
destructively updating proof data structures. In this case, since evaluation
of a tactic expression can modify the proof state between the time a choice
point is set up and the time the subsequent computation fails, the proof state
has to be remembered before a choice is tried and has to be rewound to the
remembered state before a new alternative is tried. This has been built into
the semantics of choose in such a way that only one computation for each
choice point, corresponding to trying the rst successful choice from the list
of alternatives, has left modications in the proof tree.
The net eect is that the proof representation is always well-formed and
only contains parts that correspond to successful evaluation paths. This is, of
course, relative to the concrete denition of the proof representation and its
interface to the tactic evaluation. The technical details are out of the scope
of this paper.
3.2 Replay
Remember that our aim is to be able to intervene a tactic in the middle of
its execution and later resume it in the same context. The way we realise
this is by reexecuting the tactic up to the point in its execution at which we
want to intervene. When we reexecute a tactic, we do not want to repeat
the search that was caried out when the tactic was originally executed. The
idea is to remember the successful alternatives when executing a tactic and
use them as an oracle for choosing the successful alternative without search
on reexecution.
Therefore, we dened evaluation of a tactic expression such that it collects
a trace of the sequentialised computation. A trace is a sequence the elements
of which are either tactic call markers, written call to(f), or choices, written
choice(v). When we start evaluating an expression e from the top-level we
start with an empty trace hi. We pass around the trace which we have collected
so far from one step of the evaluation to the next. Whenever we reach a choice
point and choose a value from the list of alternatives, say h, we add the choice
we have made to the trace T we have collected so far, written hT:choice(h)i,
and then carry on collecting the trace of the rest of the computation starting
with hT:choice(h)i. Whenever we have to backtrack to this choicepoint later
and choose another alternative we start with T again and add the new choice
and the trace of the remaining computation to the end of T . In a similar
manner we collect function call markers. Whenever we have evaluated the
arguments of a named tactic f and make the next step, i.e. we evaluate the
body, we extend the current trace by the tactic call marker call to(f). When
we backtrack over a call to a named tactic, the tactic call marker is removed
from the collected trace as explained for choicepoints above. We dene the
trace for a tactic expression that succeeds, written trace(e), to be the trace
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collected for the evaluation of e.
There is also a possibility to extract the trace of a computation that is not
successful: we have dened an operation abort that tactics can call to give
up completely, i.e. abort to the top-level. However, the trace collected so far
is passed back. Tactics will call abort on timeout or on manual interruption.
We will ignore this detail for the rest of the paper, however.
The computation trace that we have collected can be used to replay a com-
putation without repeating the search that is involved in nding the appro-
priate alternative in each choice point. We use the successful choices represen-
ted in the computation trace as an oracle to choose the successful alternative
without search on reexecution.
3.2.1 Simple Replay.
Evaluation of a tactic expression is now dened wrt. continuations and a
computation trace t that we have collected as described above. We simply
pass through t except for evaluation of choose and calls to named tactics.
For choose, instead of setting up a choicepoint and searching for a successful
alternative, we simply take the rst event in the trace t, say choice(v), and
use v as the value of the choose form without setting up a choicepoint. For
calls to a named tactic f we simply ignore the rst event in the computation
trace, which is call to(f).
This has the consequences that if trace(e) = t then replaying the trace,
i.e. evaluating e wrt. t, yields the same return value and has the same eect
as the original evaluation, except that the former is more eÆcient: it does not
carry out the search to determine successful choices because it can use the
trace as an oracle to determine the correct guess.
Note that there are several possibilities to guess the successful choice. We
can either, as was described above, remember and reuse the value that was
chosen in the computation. Or we can remember the position of the successful
choice in the list of alternatives and reuse the element at that position. Since
for this paper we assume that nothing has changed with the axiomatisation
or the theorem these two possibilities are equivalent. If we allowed changes to
the theorem or the axiomatisation we have to transfer the decisions made for
each individual choicepoint to its analogous counterpart. We will discuss this
point in more detail in Sect. 5.
would have to use an entirely dierent notion of what \reusing the old
choice" means. This is not in the scope of this paper, however.
As described in Sect. 2 the main point of the replay in our scenario is to be
able to replay an initial part of a computation to recover the context for the rest
of the computation. Obviously, the initial part of a computation is associated
with a prex of a computation trace. Therefore, we dene evaluation of a
tactic expression also wrt. a trace t which is a prex of the trace s collected
when the expression was evaluated earlier. Evaluation is now dened as for
simple replay if t is non-empty, and is dened as for evaluation from scratch
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when t is empty. In other words, we replay the computation corresponding to
the prex t and switch back to evaluation from scratch when we run out of
events in the trace. Again, if trace(e) = s and t is a prex of s, then replaying
the trace t yields the same result as the original computation. The replay is
more eÆcient, however, because it does not repeat the search for the initial
part of the computation described by the trace t.
3.2.2 Replay with Intervention.
With the evaluation strategy given so far we can replay an intial part of the
computation corresponding to the evaluation of a tactic expression, and then
revert to evalution from scratch in the proper context. In order to be able
to intervene the tactic at this point in the evaluation instead of continuing,
we allow the last event of a trace prex to be changed before the prex is
replayed. If the last event is choice(v), we allow this event to be replaced
by another event choice(v
0
). Instead of choosing the alternative v as in the
original computation, on reexecution v
0
is chosen and the tactic is resumed
with v
0
instead of v. This allows overriding choices that the tactic has made
without interrupting the tactic. As an example, a lemma that a tactic may
have chosen to apply at at specic point may simply be the wrong one. By
changing the event the tactic can be forced to use another lemma and carry
on as before.
Another way to interact with tactics is to replace a call to a named tactic
by the evaluation of another tactic expression, called a callback. Consider
the example in Sect. 2 where the step case tactic applied ripple out without
introducing the additional wave front. In this case, instead of calling the
tactic ripple out, step case should let the user carry out a reasoning step
interactively and then call ripple out and carry on with the tactic. To achieve
this, if the last event of an initial trace is call to(f), we allow this event to
be replaced by callback(e). On reexecution, now instead of calling the tactic
f we evaluate the expression e in the context in which f was called when t
was collected. Since the context in which e is evaluated includes the lexical
bindings of program variables, e may be an expression in the programming
language that includes free occurrences of the program variables that were
visible at the place in the original tactic denition at which f was called.
In any case, the replay collects a trace that includes the choice made to
the trace before reexecution was started, and the trace for the subsequent
computation. This means that the resulting trace can be replayed, in eect
replaying the computation with the overridden decision without any further
user intervention in the replay. This is an important property of our technique.
The trace of any computation can be replayed, yielding the same collected
trace. I.e. if s = trace(e) when replaying t, then trace(e) = s when replaying
s. Also, for such an s, replaying s is equivalent to the original computation
that produced s, i.e. it builds up the same proof representation.
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4 The Example Revisited
We now go back to the example of Sect. 2 and show how the technique descri-
bed in the previous section is applied to repair the failed proof attempt. We
noted in passing in Sect. 2, that the user spotted a possible problem with the
instantiation of Y to y in
half(y) = x =) half(Y ) = s(x)(1)
where Y should probably have the form s(s( )). The user will, therefore, want





new metavariable. So, before `ripple out' is called, the formula is changed
manually to
half(y) = x =) half(s(s(Y
0
))) = s(x)
and then the induction tactic is resumed. `Ripple out' marks the additional
wave front,
half(y) = x =) half( s(s(Y
0
)) ) = s(x)
applies the denition (2) of `half' to push the left wave front outside the `half',
removes the s on both sides of the equation to make the induction hypothesis
applicable.
half(y) = x =) s(half(Y
0
)) = s(x)
half(y) = x =) half(Y
0
) = x
At this point, `fertilize' succeeds and without further simplication the proof
is complete.
In the process of repairing this proof the user is never aware of the com-
putation traces and their replay. Pointing to the node in the proof represen-
tation where the manual intervention should take place presents the user with
a choice of possible actions, one of them being \Intervene and retry". In the
example, the relevant node is the one which contains the formula (1) on which
the `ripple out' has been applied.
Internally, each node of the proof representation is annotated with the
computation trace that was collected when the node was created in the failed
proof attempt and the tactic that was called on the relevant proof node. The-
refore, the system can execute the rippling tactic from scratch by replaying
the initial trace t up to (but excluding) the call to `ripple out' (the computa-
tion trace stored with the node). Before replaying the tactic, the computation
trace t that is to be replayed is extended by the callback event which calls a
tactic implementing user interaction and, when the interaction tactic returns,
calls `ripple out'. The evaluation rules of the tactic language ensure that after
`ripple out' returns, the original tactic is resumed as if the user interaction
had not happened and the wave front had been inserted by the tactic itself.
This only necessitates the user to make one interaction instead of simulating
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the rest of the induction tactic manually.
The callback and the user interaction are both stored in the trace that is
collected when the successful proof is constructed. This means that when the
computation needs to be replayed again later the user interaction is replayed
by the system as well and no user interaction is necessary.
5 From Replay to Reuse by Analogy
As tactics decompose a goal into subgoals by calling other tactics, an implicit
proof plan is encoded into the call graph of the used tactics. In our running
example we decided to prove the theorem by induction. In more detail we
tackled the step case by rippling out, fertilization and simplication tactics.
In even more detail, we had to instantiate Y to enable the use of the denition
of half inside the rippling tactic. Thus, replaying the same tactics on a dierent
problem corresponds to reuse by analogy. In contrast to a simple replay, we
have to translate the choicepoints of the orginal problem to corresponding
choicepoints of the target problem and use the choice that is analogous to
the choice made in the source proof. In [10] we illustrated how annotations
can be used to maintain the proof history of individual symbol occurrences
during the proof. Relating symbol occurrences of source and target proof
if they share the same annotations (i.e. proof history), we can implement
a sophisticated approach for transformational analogy. Given this mapping
of symbol occurrences of source and target problem (which is automatically
extended to derived formulas with the help of the annotated calculus [10]), we
are able to map the choices made inside the source problem to corresponding
choices to be made inside the target problem.
6 Related Work
Theorem proving by analogy has been investigated since the early days of
automated theorem proving. For a long time, computational accounts of this
analogy have been dominated by the idea of mapping symbols and single proof
steps of a source proof to a target theorem (see e.g. [16]). This turned out
to be rather insuÆcient and is far to limited to capture the intuitive notion
of a proof by analogy. Inspired by explanation based learning techniques [14],
Kolbe and Walther [12,11] developed a method for reusing proofs which is
based on generalization of proofs and conjectures by replacing occurrences of
function symbols by second order functions. Felty's and Howe's [7] approach
on proof reuse is also based on proof generalization introducing meta-variables
in proofs to nd a minimal proof using given rule schemata.
Melis [13] applied the paradigm of derivational analogy to theorem pro-
ving at the more abstract planning level. The notion of derivational analogy
was invented by Carbonell [4,19] for planning and general problem solving
where the \lines of reasoning"(i.e. the sequence of decisions and their justi-
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cations) are replayed to solve a target problem. Melis' approach is based
on the paradigm of proof planning and thus on an explicit representation of
control knowledge in terms of methods and proof plans. Our approach can be
easily integrated into standard tactic languages thus allowing to implement
derivational analogy in a procedural (instead of declarative) control language.
Richardson and Smaill [18] use a technique similar to ours to be able to
intervene with and then resume declarative methods. They store an explicit
form of the continuation with the proof representation and do not collect or
replay computation traces.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have described a technique that allows user interaction in
tactics without terminating the tactics. Users can override choices of the
tactic and insert other proof steps to be carried out before the tactic resumes.
The technique works by replaying initial parts of tactic executions and then
carrying on with the computation in the same situation in which the tactic
execution was intercepted. The tactic can then be resumed.
Our approach is simple and can be implemented easily in existing systems.
We have implemented the semantics straightforwardly in Common Lisp using
continuations. While this implementation works and is useful for experimen-
ting with the technique, it is not eÆcient enough for a production strength
theorem prover.
Therefore, we have implemented a much more eÆcient version by compiling
the tactic language into common lisp code. This has several advantages: tactic
expressions are analysed at compile-time, not run-time; careful compilation
avoids the need to construct most of the lexical closures at run-time; program
variables are translated into common lisp variables; and nally, the resulting
code can be fed through the common lisp compiler, so all its optimisations
apply to the tactics code for free, in particular most calls to named tactics
and success continuations are tail calls and so do not consume stack space.
The tactic compiler is integrated with the underlying programming language
by a common lisp macro. We plan to integrate the compiled version into the
INKA system [2].
The advantage of the technique is that both the user and the machine can
determine the overall structure of a proof, and both can ll in details of a proof
that the other is working on without interrupting it. This is not possible in
existing theorem provers.
The technique is a particular simple starting point to implement derivatio-
nal analogy in tactical theorem provers. More sophisticated forms of analogy
can be implemented by rening the way in which choice points are transferred
from the source to the target proof attempt. Also, ideas from transformatio-
nal analogy can be used to patch traces before they are replayed. We will
investigate these extensions in the future.
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